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Abstract—The main goal of a safety case is to provide a
seamless argumentation why the product developed is acceptably
safe for the purpose it is intended to. It usually consists of
different argumentations such as product-based and process-
based in order to describe the means for avoiding systematic
failures during development and controlling random failures
during operation. The main challenge during the compilation
of a safety case is to regroup and harmonize all the information
available from the different development activities in order to
provide evidence for the safety attribute of the product. The
contribution of this paper is to provide a solution for compilation
of a safety case based on automated extraction of information
coming from existing work-products.
Index Terms—ISO26262, functional safety, safety case, tool
integration, interoperability
I. INTRODUCTION
The introduction of electronics has led to several paradigm
changes, transforming passenger cars from purely mechanical
systems to complex mechatronics systems and further to
computers on roads. Hence, the mechanical systems (e.g.,
engine, transmission) are now fully under control of dedicated
electronic control units (xCUs). Innovative functionalities have
been further developed thanks to the better sensing of the
environment and to the local integration of the xCUs in the car
(e.g., smooth gear change thanks to close cooperation between
engine and transmission). The innovation trend further follows
the information society by integrating information surrounding
the vehicle (e.g., GPS, car-2-X communication) for improving
the overall vehicle efficiency.
Consequently, the automotive electronic architecture be-
come very complex. Current cars are running with several
hundred millions of lines of software code that have been
developed conjointly by large teams from different institutions.
At the same time, the higher degree of integration and the
safety-criticality of the control application raise new chal-
lenges. Hence, the correctness of the applications both in the
time domain and in the value domain has to be guaranteed.
Due to the safety-criticality of the E/E control system, the
xCUs are developed according to safety standards like the
automotive functional safety standard ISO 26262 [1].
A major challenge in this context is the development of
safety cases. The purpose of a safety case has been defined
in [2] as communicating a clear, comprehensive and defensible
argument that a system is acceptably safe to operate in
a particular context. Different challenge arise: (1) System
complexity of the control systems, requiring the support of
different engineering disciplines and making the understanding
of the entire system by a single technical chief engineer
challenging; (2) Safety-critical attribute and the resulting
strong safety requirements, leading to complex development
and validation processes and methods (e.g., semi-formal or for-
mal requirements, MC/DC coverage analysis); (3) Distributed
development by different teams and different institutions, thus
reducing the availability of knowledge and information across
the teams and making the compilation and review of safety
argumentations more difficult.
At the same time, a development shift is currently occur-
ring in the automotive domain with the introduction of the
ISO 26262. Hence, the risk based development (identification
of hazards, definition of safety requirements, execution of
safety analyses and safety validation) is being integrated in the
company internal development environments and processes.
This is however an evolutionary process and paradigm changes
as proposed in the CESAR project [3] with fully integrated
tool-chains covering the entire development process and pro-
viding full traceability of the product attributes are not indus-
trially available yet. However, implicit traces (e.g., provided
by the safety goals as outcome from hazard analysis and risk
assessment and as basis for safety concept development, safety
analysis and safety validation) are already available in current
industry projects.
The purpose of this work is to present a method for
automated compilation of product-related safety argumentation
based on automated extraction of information coming from ex-
isting work products of industrial development processes. This
approach relies on (a) state-of-practice trace management tools
(e.g., requirement management) which are explicitly linking
information together within a specific development activity,
(b) interoperability and integration concepts (as developed in
CESAR1 with the interoperability specification [4] and being
further enhanced in e.g., MBAT2, CRYSTAL3, VeTeSS4) in
order to automatically link the partial traces together, and (c)
the implicit traces coming from the risk oriented development
1www.cesarproject.eu
2www.mbat-artemis.eu
3www.artemis-ia.eu/project/index/view?project=46
4www.vetess.eu
process defined by the ISO 26262.
The paper is organized as follow: Section II describes the
state of the art with respect to (modular) safety cases and safety
argumentation. Section III presents the proposed approach.
Section IV provides an evaluation of the method applied on a
pilot project. Finally Section V concludes this work.
II. STATE OF THE ART: SAFETY CASE AND TOOL
INTEGRATION
According to ISO 26262 [1] a safety case is defined as
an “argument that the safety requirements for an item are
complete and satisfied by evidence compiled from work prod-
ucts of the safety activities during development”. ISO 26262
Part 2, Annex C states the three following review criteria
for the completeness of the safety case: confirmation that the
referenced work-products are (a) traceable from each other,
(b) consistent (no contradictions within or between each-
other), and (c) complete (no open issues that can lead to the
violation of a safety goal). This definition is in line with [2]
where the purpose of a safety case is to “communicate a
clear, comprehensive and defensible argument that a system
is acceptably safe to operate in a particular context”.
In [2] the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) is introduced.
It aims at formalizing the argumentation based on the three
following pillars (a) safety requirement, (b) safety argument
and (c) safety evidence – the safety argument making the
link between objective and evidence. Important care is set
to a good balancing between argument and evidence: an
argument without evidence is unfounded, and an evidence
without argument is unexplained. An extension of the GSN
language is proposed in [5]. During this work the author draws
the parallelism between software architecture and safety case
architecture, and provide an extension of the GSN approach
that is modular and compositional, and thus better suits the
modular structure of the software architecture.
A first important aspect is the importance of providing
both process-based arguments (to minimize probability of
systematic design faults) and product-based arguments (to
control random faults and provide evidence that the system
behaves acceptably safe), as discussed in [6]–[8]. In [6]
industrial experiences for building safety cases in the context
of ISO 26262 are presented. Focus is set on the necessity to
have both process-based arguments (to minimize probability
of systematic design fault) and product-based arguments (to
minimize random fault and provide evidence that the system
behaves acceptably safe). An important outcome is the chal-
lenge for the companies to align their development process
for explicit full compliance to the standard. At the same
time the existence of work-products in the company internal
development process covering different major aspects required
by the standard is acknowledged.
The work discussed in [7] describes the concept of “generic
safety cases” in the context of railway domain according to the
safety standard for railway applications EN 50129 [9]. During
this approach, the argumentation is split into “generic product
safety case” (independent of application), “generic application
safety case” (for a class of applications), and “specific appli-
cation safety case” (for a specific application). These three
levels are mapped to different part of the development having a
potential of reuse in other projects (e.g., communication archi-
tecture). All the three levels present the same structure (system
definition, quality management, safety management, technical
safety, related safety cases and summary) with product-related
argumentation and process related argumentation.
A second important aspect is the parallelism between the
safety argumentation and the safety requirements [10],
[11]. The work presented in [10] describes an approach for
generating safety concept trees out of component fault trees.
The approach is based on a risk-oriented development and the
development of fault trees for each component. These fault
trees are then logically inverted to generate safety requirements
trees (identifying the counter measures in a systematic way)
for the system specification.
Similar to that, the work presented in [11] provide classes
of requirements to describe and formalize the technical refine-
ment required during the definition of the safety concept. This
proposed formalization is based on vertical safety interface
following the layered scheme of control systems – starting
with application specific argumentations that are refined and
integrated with platform specific argumentations (covering the
aspects of basis services, operating systems, communication).
This language enables pre-certification of components and the
later certification of the entire systems, such improving re-use
capability and partitioning the efforts for certification.
Based on these two observations, the proposed approach
in this work will be to use the information already available
within the development process in order to perform auto-
mated safety case compilation for the product-based part of
the argumentation. This compilation (and thus access to the
information within the development process) shall be strongly
supported by the work on tool integration and interoperability
performed during the CESAR project, see [3] for a detailed
technical overview on the project and [4] for the aspects on
interoperability.
The works described in [12], [13] describe the different
aspects of tool integration on the example of an automotive
tool chain. Important aspects from the integration point of view
are the integration platform (providing basic services such as
workflow engine, repository, transformation engine, standard
APIs) and the semantic understanding (providing a common
semantic between different methods and tools, which is re-
quired to exchange information and describe the relationships
between the elements). From the end-user point of view, the
development process (performing the links between the related
standard(s), the development methods and the relying tools) is
the main driver. During this work, main focus will be set on
the semantic aspect – how to transform and relate the existing
information (safety analysis, safety concept, safety validation)
together.
Regarding the process-based argumentation, a loosely inte-
grated approach is proposed in [14]. Databases are provided to
list the safety activities required by the ISO 26262 as well as
the requirements allocated to these safety activities. By filling
the databases with evidence of completion of these activities,
the process-based argumentation can be set-up. Note that this
has a direct impact on the product-related argumentation:
Hence, the outcomes of these activities (e.g., safety analysis,
safety validation) can be then integrated into the automated
safety case compilation.
III. AUTOMATED COMPILATION OF PRODUCT-RELATED
SAFETY ARGUMENTATION
A. Overview of the approach
The proposed approach for automated compilation of prod-
uct related safety argumentation is to automatically extract
summary information from the different work-products and
map these information together. The expected benefits are
(a) to provide a technical overview of the product being
developed, and (b) to ease consistency review between the
work-products. Figure 1 illustrates the approach. The data
generated by the different activities are summarized, grouped
and linked together in order to illustrate how the safety
objectives, arguments and evidence are mapped together. The
information is grouped around the safety goals. Hence, they
represent the safety objectives and are thus the central point
of interest.
During the concept phase, the hazard analysis and risk
assessment (based on the item definition) is generated. This
document provides the safety objectives (list of safety goals)
mapped to their context (list of system functions, malfunctions
and hazards). The next phase is the development of the
safety concept. During this phase, the safety argumentation
is build based on the successive refinements from safety
goals to functional and technical safety requirements down
to finally software and hardware safety requirements. Note
that this is not a monolithic activity – The safety concept is
refined iteratively with the system specification and analyzed
using different safety analyses. The safety analyses serves the
verification of the safety concept, e.g., to ensure complete-
ness of counter measures with respect to possible component
failures. Finally, the test concept provides an evidence for
the correctness of the safety requirements fulfillment (safety
arguments).
Note that the purpose of this safety case is not to replace
existing documents. On the contrary, it aims at providing a
technical summary of the activities and mapping these activ-
ities together. Therefore, the full information is still available
in the original documents.
The proposed view supports project reviews with respect to
the following criterias:
1) The safety objectives (safety goals) have been com-
pletely identified based on the system functions and
related hazards
2) The safety argumentation (hierarchy of safety require-
ments) is correct and consistent to the safety objectives
3) The safety argumentation (hierarchy of safety require-
ments) is complete with respect to possible component
failures
4) The safety evidence (test concept) validates the safety
argumentation by ensuring the correct operation of the
proposed counter measures
Fig. 1. Proposed data structure
Note additionally that this approach is very useful during
development (and during milestone review) to illustrate at-
tributes of the system. Hence, this approach can be used to
monitor development status and perform some check such as
completeness of description (are the elements complete – e.g.,
all requirement fields filled) or completeness of traces (are all
the traces available – e.g., all requirements have a trace to at
least a test case).
B. Hazard analysis and risk assessment – extraction of safety
goals
The main purpose of the hazard analysis and risk assessment
is to analyze the functionalities of the system in its intended
context and to identify and classify the possible hazards. Main
outcome here are the safety goals – which represent the safety
objectives during the project. During the automated extraction,
each safety goal is mapped with its related hazards. The
malfunction leading to the hazard is listed as well in order
to provide a clearer understanding of the context. Note that
the reasoning for the hazard classification is not integrated
in the safety concept. Hence, the hazard analysis and risk
assessment document remains available for more detailed
reviews if required.
Fig. 2. Information extracted from the hazard analysis and risk assessment
Figure 2 illustrates the information automatically extracted
from the hazard analysis and risk assessment document. It
consists of the safety goals (unique identifier, ASIL, title), the
related malfunctions and the hazards (unique identifier, ASIL,
title). This view supports the documentation of the context
leading to the safety goals. Note also that different tests can be
performed automatically as well: Are the trees complete (all
the malfunction have an hazard), are the elements complete
(identifier, ASIL, title), are the ASIL level consistent (safety
goal shall have the ASIL of the highest hazard).
C. Safety concept – extraction of safety requirements
The main purpose while developing the safety concept is
to systematically refine the safety argumentation by providing
functional requirements, then technical requirements, and fi-
nally software (resp. hardware) requirements to mitigate the
risks. Content of the automated extraction are the hierarchy of
requirements with their identifier and their traces.
Fig. 3. Information extracted from the safety concept
Figure 3 illustrates the information extracted from the
functional safety concept, technical safety concept and SW
(resp. HW) safety requirements. The elements consists of
unique identifiers, ASIL, requirement title. Note that further
information such as e.g., full text, rationale, or acceptance
criteria are not extracted here. The purpose of the safety case
is to provide an overview of the product, detailed information
needs to be retrieved in the respective documents. Such view
enables different tests such as: completeness of the traces
between the requirements, completeness of the requirements
(are the fields filled), consistency of the ASIL within the safety
argumentation.
D. Safety analysis – extraction of component malfunctions and
required counter measures
The objective of safety analyses is to identify the conditions
and causes that could lead to the violation of a safety goal, and
subsequently to identify and confirm the safety requirements.
The challenge is to integrate the safety analysis in context of
the safety concept (both safety goals and safety requirements).
Content of the automated extraction is the component failures
mapped to the safety goals (effects on the system) and to the
safety requirements to mitigate the effects.
Fig. 4. Information extracted from the safety analysis
Figure 4 illustrates the information extracted from the safety
analysis. The main target of this view is to list all the possible
component malfunctions having an eventual impact for a given
safety goal, and to further show the trace to the related safety
requirement that mitigate the risk. Similar to the previous
views, only a summary of the information is provided (in this
case: safety goal identifier and text, component name and its
malfunction, as well as safety requirement identifier and title).
The full information is available in the main documents (e.g.,
FMEA report, safety concept), and this view illustrates the
logical links between the different information and documents.
This view supports the (verification) review of the safety
concept against the possible component malfunctions. More
especially, following topics can be reviewed:
• correctness: is the safety requirement appropriate for the
malfunction
• completeness: are all the malfunctions linked to at least
one safety requirement
• consistency: are the safety requirements consistent to
each other for the possible component malfunctions iden-
tified
E. Test concept – extraction of evidence
The final step in the argumentation is the documentation of
the evidences that the required counter measures have been
implemented and are working properly. This step is usually
performed by means of test execution. The main target in
this view is therefore to illustrate the link between the safety
requirements and the related test cases.
Fig. 5. Information extracted from the test concept
Figure 5 illustrates the information extracted from the test
concept. It is mainly very similar to the safety concept and
has in addition the test cases (identifier and title) mapped
to the requirements. Note that this view is usually generated
during different generations of tests. Hence, SW (respectively
HW) safety requirements are usually validated in the context
of component tests (e.g., MiL, SiL or PiL – Model, Software
or Processor in the Loop). Technical safety requirements are
usually validated in the context of entire control systems (e.g.,
HiL – HW in the Loop), while functional safety requirements
and safety goals are usually validated in the context of the
entire system or the vehicle (test beds, vehicle platform).
Similar to the safety concept, the full information is avail-
able in the main work products (e.g., full requirement text,
full test case). This view illustrates the logical links between
the different elements and support the (verification) review of
the test campaign. More especially, following topics can be
reviewed:
• correctness: are the test cases appropriate for the safety
requirements
• completeness: are all the safety requirements linked to at
least one test case
• completeness (respectively): are all the test cases mapped
to a safety requirement (or is there any new function to
be tested that is not yet part of the system specification)
• consistency: are the different test campaigns consistent to
each other
IV. INTEGRATION IN COMPANY PROCESSES AND
APPLICATION IN INDUSTRIAL CONTEXT
A. Overview of the approach
One main challenge for application of new methods in
industrial context is the alignment with company internal
processes, methods and tools. Therefore, an important re-
quirement for this approach was the high flexibility to cope
with the different environments and templates. The developed
environment consists of three main components:
• Wrapper
• Database
• Report generator
Wrapper: The purpose of the wrapper is to provide inter-
faces to the different tools and environments, in order to get
access to the data in an automated way. During this work,
wrappers to MS Excel documents, MS Access databases and
to requirement management tools such as PTC Integrity5 were
developed. Further interfaces, e.g., to Enterprise Architect6 for
SysML modeling, are currently being developed.
Database: Once the data has been imported, it has to be
structured and taken into relation with the remaining data
imported from the other sources. This activity strongly relates
to semantic understanding and model transformation – the
definition of a meta-model for the proper structuring of the
information and the capability to link the different inputs with
this defined meta-model (transform the format of the input data
into the scheme defined by the meta-model). In this work, the
meta-model presented in Section III has been used. Note that
most of the tools present more complex data structure than the
one described in this work - the additional information were
not uploaded since not relevant in the context of the product-
related safety case argumentation (keep in mind that the safety
case presents an overview of the results and does not replace
the work-products realized previously).
Report generator: Once the full information has been
imported, harmonized and structured, then the post processing
can take place. It consists of automated graph generation using
the freeware DOT7 and report generation using LATEX. For each
safety goal, four dedicated graphs are generated:
• Hazard and risk analysis: List of system malfunctions and
related hazards identified for each safety goal
• Safety concept: Safety requirements refined from each
safety goal
• Safety analysis: Related component failures having a
potential impact on each safety goal
• Test concept: List of test cases mapped to the safety
requirements related to each safety goal
Furthermore, automated checks can be executed on this
database in order to check the correctness and completeness
of the data – see [15] for more information. Finally, a PDF
report is generated out of this information.
B. Hazard analysis and risk assessment – extraction of safety
goals
The process of hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA)
in the context of ISO 26262 consists at identifying the different
system functionalities, deducing the possible malfunctions
and map these malfunctions to driving situations and vehicle
environments in order to identify the possible hazards. In a
second step, the hazards are then classified according to their
severity, exposure and controllability, and finally grouped to
safety goals. The safety goals represent therefore the main
5http://www.mks.com/platform/
6http://www.sparxsystems.com.au/
7http://www.graphviz.org/
Fig. 6. Example: Mapping between hazards and safety goals
targets for the following safety development. It is therefore
important to properly document each safety goal and its
context - in this case the malfunctions and hazards related
to the safety goal.
This step has been performed using an MS Excel wrapper.
The HARA elements have been automatically extracted from
the project document based on the company templates. Note
that the example illustrated in Figure 6 has been modified and
reduced due to confidentiality issues.
For this pilot project, the HARA document consists of
five safety goals and 64 hazards analyzed. This relatively
small project already illustrates the needs of such view: the
information can be visualized (and therefore reviewed) from
the perspective (viewpoint) of the safety goals, and not only
from the perspective of the functions or hazards. This enables
a review that can be performed more efficiently: the review
can be performed more topic related and can be dispatched
into different teams more easily.
C. Safety concept – extraction of safety requirements
The next step is the identification of the functional and
technical safety concepts, and the further refinement to SW
safety requirements (respectively HW safety requirements).
This work focuses on the systematic refinement from the
safety goals to single technical solutions to be implemented as
combination of SW functions and electronic HW components
(and eventually other technologies). This is a challenging
task since a high level of accuracy is required, thus leading
to a large number of requirements. At the same time, the
development target (safety goal) shall be kept in mind, and
a certain degree of redundancy between the safety goals
exist (e.g., methods to ensure the integrity of the computing
platform).
This activity strongly relies on industrial requirement man-
agement tools. Tools such as PTC Integrity, IBM Ratio-
nal DOORS or Dassault Reqtify provide a solid framework
for requirement elicitation (which information a requirement
shall contain) and for requirement management (how the
requirements are logically organized – traces between the
requirements). During this work, we have implemented a
wrapper to PTC Integrity in order to automatically extract
specific requirement fields as well as the links between the
requirements, see Figure 7. The identifiers at the begin of
the fields are unique requirement identifiers within Integrity.
With this ID, the full requirement text can be retrieved during
review.
For this pilot project, 2915 requirements were parsed. From
this database, 207 requirements were identified as being direct
or indirect children from the safety goals identified previously.
The identification of their related document field indicates their
affiliation as functional, technical or SW safety requirement.
This view played a central role during the review of the
safety concept. Hence, it enables to split the large number
of requirements per target (for each safety goal) and to review
the soundness of the safety concept for each safety goal.
Furthermore, this view combined with the HARA view enables
a cross check of the safety concept in the context of the hazards
identified previously. Note finally that this requirement export
was also the basis for different checks indicating the quality of
the requirements (e.g., availability and completeness of traces,
checks if important fields are filled).
D. Safety analysis – extraction of component malfunctions and
required counter measures
The execution of safety analyses is usually a parallel step
to the safety concept discussed in the previous section. The
aim of this step is to consolidate the safety concept by the
systematic (inductive and deductive) analysis of the possible
component faults and possible impacts on the safety goals.
An important outcome of this work is the mapping between
detailed faults at component level, safety goals at vehicle level,
and safety requirements to properly identify and react to the
faulty situations.
During this pilot project, three approaches have been com-
pared: an MS Excel template, a dedicated database and in-
dustrial tools such as API IQ-FMEA and FaultTree++. From
the safety analyses point of view, all approaches have their
trade-off with respect to flexibility (tailoring of the safety
analysis method to project needs), efforts to tailor and execute
the method, and efforts to ensure consistency over the large
amount of information. With regards to integrating safety
analyses in this automated safety case compilation, all three
methods present a structured way to access to the information
(the semantics is known and similar between the approaches).
The syntax, however, differs (XML formats, MS Excel inter-
Fig. 7. Example: Mapping between safety goals and safety requirements
Fig. 8. Example: Mapping between safety goals and component malfunctions (FMEA)
face). Figure 8 provides a modified example for an interface
FMEA.
Regarding the FMEA at control system level, a total of 56
interfaces were analyzed; 26 interfaces have been identified as
having potential impact to one or more safety goal(s), and 18
safety requirements were mapped to these interfaces in order to
identify and react to possible component failures. This view
was important to review the appropriateness between safety
requirements and system architecture (and possible component
failures). The safety goal centric approach is useful to focus
on one topic at one time and to enable to split the review in
different teams.
E. Test concept – extraction of evidence
The compilation and execution of test cases is a central
aspect to provide evidence of correct implementation of the
safety measures. Typical challenges for test management are
to check completeness of the test campaign with respect to
the requirements (for requirement-based tests) and to illustrate
the appropriateness of the test campaign for the safety context
(hazards and component malfunctions previously identified).
An additional challenge is the large number of test platforms
(e.g., MIL, SIL, PIL, HIL, testbed, vehicle) and the large
variability to manage the test documentation.
Similarly to the safety analyses, a large number of test
environments needed to be supported in this industrial context.
The structure of the information was similar for the different
environments, the way to access the data differed. All test
cases have a unique ID, title, description, mapping to require-
ment ID, status. This information is automatically extracted
and mapped to the respective safety requirement, see Figure 9.
Note that this figure has been modified for confidentiality
issues. Furthermore, this figure shows only the test performed
at SW level (and not at control system level or at vehicle level)
– only the SW requirements are mapped. This illustrates that
the validation at SW level has been accomplished, however the
validation of the safety requirements at control system level
and at vehicle level are still open.
In this pilot project, a total of 3772 test cases are available.
A subset of 167 test cases are mapped to safety requirements.
This view documents and supports the review of the com-
pleteness of the test campaign for the provided safety context.
Note furthermore that the capability to import data from
different sources and the needs to combine and harmonize the
different inputs strongly support improvement of the quality.
Hence, automated checks can be performed, e.g., to check
the completeness of traces or check the correct fulfillment of
different fields.
V. CONCLUSION
The compilation and maintenance of a safety case during
the project duration is a tedious task. Hence, the safety case
shall provide an argumentation that the product is acceptably
safe for its indented purpose. This argumentation is based
Fig. 9. Example: Mapping between safety requirements and test campaign
on and summarizes the different work-products generated
during project execution – the consistency between the work-
products has to be established and maintained, each change
in a work-product has a potential impact on the safety case.
A method for automated compilation of the product-based
argumentation based on the existing work-product has been
presented in this work. This approach strongly reduces the
efforts for compilation of a safety case. Moreover, the gen-
erated document supports review of the safety argumentation
and enables automated checks of different criterias (e.g., with
respect to completeness and consistency of the argumentation).
This is also useful during the project (e.g., at milestones) for
technical management of the safety aspects. To summarize,
quality improvement in project results from
• the capability to perform context aware reviews supported
by dedicated views
• the possibility to run automated checks based on a criteria
catalog (quality metrics) and to automatically assess the
documentation
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